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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Constitutional Right of Privacy
In recent years the provisions of the first' and the fourteenth'
amendments relating to freedom of association and freedom of speech
have raised questions concerning the extent of the protection of indi-
vidual privacy.3 This article will examine these two provisions
in light of the decided cases to determine if constitutionally protected
rights of privacy4 exist for individuals in regard to their associational
relationships5 and their speech.
Associations
The idea that privacy of the individual underlies the limitations
upon governmental action contained in the first amendment was first
articulated by Justice Brandeis in a dissenting opinion to Gilbert v.
Minnesota.' Gilbert, a member of the Non-partisan League, was
convicted of violating a Minnesota statute7 which made the teaching
or advocation that men should not enlist in the armed forces of the
United States a crime. He had made such a speech at a public rally.
On appeal of this case to the United States Supreme Court it was
1 "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech,...
or the right of the people peaceably to assemble." U.S. CoNsT. amend. I.
2 "No State shall... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, with-
out due process of law." U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV.
'For other recent articles which have dealt with this same general area,
see Robinson, Protection of Associations From Compulsory Disclosure of
Membership, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 614 (1958); Comment, The Constitutional
Right to Anonymity: Free Speech, Disclosure and the Devil, 70 YALE L.J.
1084 (1961); Comment, 66 YALE L.J. 545 (1957). This article will not be
concerned with the tort action for the invasion of the right of privacy. See
generally for the elements of the tort action Nizer, The Right of Privacy, 39
MicH. L. REv. 526 (1941); Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALm. L. REv. 383 (1960);
Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REv. 193 (1891).
' The constitutionally protected right of privacy in regard to search and
seizure is beyond the scope of this article since the primary focus is on the
first amendment. For cases which illustrate how individual privacy is con-
sidered in relation to search and seizure cases see generally Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960); Wolf v.
Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) ; Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914);
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
'As used in this article, the term associational relationships means the
relations between the various members of associations, both as between them-
selves and as between outsiders.
'254 U.S. 352 (1920).
'Minn. Laws 1917, ch. 463 (now 40 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 612.08 (1947)).
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argued that the statute was unconstitutional because it was in con-
flict with the "inherent right of free speech respecting the concerns,
activities and interests of the United States . . . and its Govern-
ment."' The Court, for purposes of decision, assumed that such an
inherent right existed, but held that such a right was not absolute
and that a state, by virtue of its police power, could in time of war
constitutionally enact such a statute.
Justice Brandeis, dissenting, first noted that the Minnesota statute
was not a war measure because it was not restricted in its application
to times when the nation was at war.9 Moreover, the statute, by its
broad sweep, prohibited teaching the doctrines of pacifism to any
one, at any time, and in any place. "Thus the statute invades the
privacy and freedom of the home. Father and mother may not
follow the promptings of religious belief, of conscience or of convic-
tion, and teach son or daughter the doctrine of pacifism."' 0 Finally,
Justice Brandeis argued that such rights as freedom of speech are
given to citizens of the states as a part of the liberty guaranteed by
the fourteenth amendment." One of the underlying premises upon
which this dissent was based was that the individual citizen had a
right of privacy in regard to his beliefs"2 and in regard to his actions
in his home. Also, this right of privacy is a part of liberty given to
individuals by the first and fourteenth amendments.'
Privacy in regard to one form of associational relationship was
before the Court for the first time in Prudential Ins. Co. v. Cheek.' 4
Prudential was held liable for damages in a civil suit for violation
8 254 U.S. at 328. 9Id. at 334.10 Id. at 335. 11 Id. at 336.
12 The idea that an individual's belief's are private and beyond the scope
of governmental action was alluded to in two early cases which involved
prosecution of members of the Mormon church for bigamy. Davis v. Beason,
133 U.S. 333 (1890); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
" The scope of the limitation upon state action which violates privacy was
not spelled out in the dissent. -However, in regard to speech, Justice Brandeis
followed the view that in times of emergency speech could be limited in order
to prevent a clear and present danger to the nation. It seems therefore that
in similar situations more intrusion into the privacy of the individual would
be tolerated. Perhaps Justice Brandeis believed that the right of privacy and
the right of freedom of speech should be identical in scope since the former
was derived from the latter. The clear and present danger test in regard to
speech was first announced by Justice Holmes in Schenck v. United States,
249 U.S. 47 (1919). For discussions of the clear and present danger test,
see generally Chafee, Freedom of Speech in Time of War, 32 HARV. L. REv.
932 (1919); Nathanson, The Communist Triat and the Clear and Present
Danger Test, 63 HARv. L. REv. 1167 (1950).1,259 U.S. 530 (1921).
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of the Service Letter Law of Missouri.'" This statute required
every corporation doing business in the state to furnish upon request
to any employee when the employee was discharged a letter.which
set forth the nature and duration of his service and which stated
truly the cause of the employee's departure. Prudential had refused
to give such a letter to Cheek, a former employee. One defense
which Prudential set up was that the statute in question violated the
fourteenth amendment because it deprived persons of their "liberty
of silence." The Supreme Court rejected this contention and held
that no provision of the Constitution conferred any liberty of silence
or any right of "privacy upon either persons or corporations.""
This holding, that corporations have no rights of privacy under the
Constitution, has been reaffirmed in a number of later cases.
The weight to be given to Prudential upon the question of an
individual's right to keep some of his associational relationships
private can best be determined by considering subsequent decisions.'
De Jonge v. Oregon9 is the leading case decided by the Court where
associational relationships in the area of political action were in-
volved. This case involved an Oregon statute" which provided that
any person who presided at, conducted, or assisted in conducting any
assembly which taught or advocated the doctrine of criminal syndi-
calism would be guilty of a felony. The Communist Party sponsored
a public rally in Portland to protest police violence in connection with
a longshoremen's strike then in progress. De Jonge, who was a
member of the Communist Party, was the second speaker at the
rally. In his speech he protested against conditions in the city jail,
the actions of the city police, and urged people at the rally to take
home Communist literature. While the rally was in progress police
arrived and arrested several of the participants, including De Jonge.
He was subsequently indicted, tried and convicted under the pro-
1 Mo. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §290.140 (1952).
259 U.S. at 542.
See, e.g., United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632 (1950);
United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43
(1906).
8 It is interesting to note that the corporation was the only party in
Prudential asserting any claims to privacy; therefore, the reference to "per-
sons" could be considered as a dictum. Moreover, Gitlow v. New York, 268
U.S. 652, 666 (1925), characterized the Court's reference to freedom of
speech and the fourteenth amendment as "incidental" and not determinative
of that question. Regardless, this broad language still stands because it has
never been expressly overruled.19299 U.S. 353 (1937). 20 Ore. Laws 1933, ch. 459, §§ 1-4.
[Vol. 40
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visions of this statute. As construed by the Oregon Supreme Court,21
this indictment charged that De Jonge participated in a meeting
called by the Communist Party and that the party advocated crimi-
nal syndicalism. The conviction was reversed on appeal by the
United States Supreme Court on the ground that it violated the
rights given to citizens of the states under the first amendment as
made applicable to the states by the fourteenth amendment.
In support of its decision, the Court first noted that "freedom of
speech and of the press are fundamental rights .... The right of
peaceable assembly is a right cognate to those of free speech and free
press and is equally fundamental."2 2  Then it observed that these
rights are not absolute but that they may be subject to reasonable
regulation by a state where they are used "to incite violence and
crime."2 3  However, the rights themselves may not be curtailed; a
state may only prohibit the abuses which flow from their exercise.
Finally, the Court concluded that "peaceable assembly for lawful
discussion cannot be made a crime," that a state has no power to
inquire as to the relations of the speakers to the association, and that
mere participation in an otherwise lawful and peaceable assembly
cannot be made a crime.24
De Jonge established the concept that where individuals assemble
peaceably for a lawful purpose a state government has no power to
inquire into the relations between the participants. Clear recogni-
tion of the necessity for some privacy in regard to the relations be-
tween the members of associations was accorded by the Court; how-
ever, this right of privacy was limited to associations which had a
lawful purpose and which involved activities of a political nature.
Moreover, the sweeping language used in the Prudential decision
was limited.
The emphasis upon the lawfulness of the association and its effect
upon the degree of privacy afforded to its members is illustrated by
the earlier case of New York ex rel. Bryant v. Zim-merman.25 A
New York statute26 required that every membership corporation and
unincorporated association which required an oath as a condition
of membership file with the secretary of state a sworn copy of a
roster of its members and a list of its officers. The statute further
21 State v. De Jonge, 152 Ore. 315, 51 P.2d 674 (1935).
22 299 U.S. at 364. 23Id. at 364.
2 1 Id. at 365. 25278 U.S. 63 (1928).
20 N.Y. Civm RIGHTs LAW §§ 53-56.
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provided that any person who remained a member with knowledge
that the organization had failed to comply with the registration pro-
visions would be guilty of a misdemeanor. Bryant was a member
of the Ku Klux Klan who knew that this association had failed to
register. He was prosecuted and convicted under the statute. Later,
he brought a habeas corpus action to obtain his release from jail,
contending, inter alia, that the statute was unconstitutional in that
it deprived him of the liberty guaranteed by the fourteenth amend-
ment. On appeal the United States Supreme Court rejected this
contention and held the statute to be a constitutional exercise of the
state's police power because this was a reasonable disclosure in view
of the nature and purpose of the organization involved. To support
this conclusion the Court cited hearings before the United States
Congress27 which tended to show that the Klan was conducting a
crusade against Catholics, Jews and Negroes, stimulating religious
and race prejudice and committing various acts of violence and
breaches of the peace. However, the Court recognized that such
disclosure of the membership to the public would be "an effective or
substantial deterrent" upon the association which would prevent it
from carrying out its purposes."'
Since the decision in Zimmerman, two federal registration and
disclosure statutes have been upheld against attacks on their consti-
tutionality in relation to the first amendment. The first was the
Foreign Agents Registration Act29 which requires that every person
acting as an agent of a foreign principal in certain listed capacities,
such as public relations counsel or publicity agent, file a registration
statement with the Attorney General. The statement must contain
such data as a copy of the agent's contract with his principal, the
compensation he received from his principal, and the names of all
persons who have contributed or promised to contribute to the
compensation received; further, willful failure to file the required
statement is made a crime. The Supreme Court, in a case which
raised no constitutional issue,80 construed the statute to mean that
no purely personal information was required of the registrant;
thus again the Court by implication recognized that disclosure of an
individual's private affairs must be strictly limited. Later, a lower
27 278 U.S. at 72.
28 Id. at 72.
29 52 Stat, 631 (1938), 22 U.S.C. §§ 611-621 (1958).
" Viereck v. United States, 318 U.S. 236 (1943).
[Vol. 40
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federal court, in United States v. Peace Information Center,8 held
the statute to be constitutional as a regulation of the nation's foreign
affairs and as a national defense measure; further, the court observed
that the statute merely regulated a vocation and did not prohibit
speech or the expression of ideas.32
In Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities
Control Board8 the Supreme Court held that the registration pro-
visions of the Subversive Activities Control Act34 did not violate
the first amendment. This statute requires any organization which
has been found by the Subversive Activities Control Board to be
either a "Communist-action organization" or a "Communist-front
organization" to register with the Attorney General. The Com-
munist Party in the United States was found to be a Communist-
action organization and ordered to register. The Party, appealing
from this determination, contended that the registration provision
was unconstitutional because it deprived the members of the Party
of their freedom of association by forcing them to disclose their
membership. Rejecting this contention, the Court pointed out that
the Communist Party was directed by a foreign nation and that its
main purpose is to overthrow the government by force and violence.
Thus the purpose of the organization was illegal and the danger
which it presented was of such a magnitude that Congress had the
power to regulate it. Also, the statute under consideration did not
prohibit speech or association of the members; all that it did was to
require them to register. However, the Court recognized that in
many circumstances enforced disclosure could act as a deterrent to
the organization and an infringement upon the member's rights of
association. But in this case, the nature and purposes of the asso-
ciation over-rode any claims to privacy that its members may have
had.
Where neither the Communist Party nor acts of Congress have
been involved, three recent decisions3 5 have given clear recognition
to the idea that the Constitution imposes some limitation on the
power of state governments to expose the members of lawful asso-
ciations. These cases involved the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People. In these cases, southern states
" 97 F. Supp. 255 (D.D.C. 1951). (No appeal was taken.)
832Id. at 262. 88367 U.S. 1 (1961).' 64 Stat. 987 (1950), 50 U.S.C. §§ 781-797 (1958).
"Louisiana v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293 (1961); Bates v. City of Little
Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama, 357. U.S. 449 (1958).
1962]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
were attempting to force the NAACP to disclose the names of indi-
viduals who were members within the state. In the first and leading
case in this series, NAACP v. Alabama, Alabama brought suit to
enjoin the NAACP from doing business in the state because of
alleged violation of a statute86 which required all foreign corporations
doing business in the state to register with the secretary of state.
During the course of the trial, the trial judge, upon motion by the
state of Alabama, made an order which required the NAACP to
produce a large number of its records, including the Association's
membership lists. All of the required records where produced except
the membership lists which the Association refused to produce. For
this failure to comply with the court's order, the NAACP was found
to be in contempt and ordered to pay a heavy fine. 7 On appeal the
United States Supreme Court struck down this order of the trial
court and the contempt conviction based on it as being in violation
of the first and fourteenth amendments. Again, the Court recog-
nized that in some instances a state may have a legitimate reason to
expose the membership of associations; however, the Court clearly
stated that compelled disclosure may act as a restraint on freedom
of association. Thus "inviolability of privacy in group association
may in many circumstances be indispensable to preservation of free-
dom of association, particularly where a group espouses dissident
beliefs."3
In the latest case which has dealt specifically with freedom of
association, Shelton v. Tucker, 9 the Court held that an Arkansas
statute 0 which required all school teachers to disclose all organiza-
tions to which they had belonged for the past five years was an
unconstitutional interference with the teacher's freedom of associa-
tion. While recognizing the state's legitimate need to investigate
the teacher's qualifications, still "to compel a teacher to disclose his
every associational tie is to impair that teacher's right of free
association."'"
Speech and Individual Privacy
The cases discussed above give clear recognition to the fact that
in many lawful associations, the individual members have a right to
*' ALA. CODE tit. 10, §§ 192-198 (1959).
Ex parte NAACP, 265 Ala. 349, 91 So. 2d 214 (1956).
38 357 U.S. at 463. ', 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
'o ARK. STAT. ANN. § 80-1229 (1960).
,1364 U.S. at 485.
[Vol. 40
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keep the fact of their membership private. A related area of an
individual's privacy is in regard to speech by other individuals.
Thus, in regard to free speech, which the first amendment protects,
the individual's privacy is a factor considered by the Court in deter-
mining the extent of this speech. The earlier cases that involved
constitutionally protected speech tended to put the right to speak
above all other considerations. Thus, in Martin v. City of Struthers4
it was held that a city ordinance which made criminal the act of
summoning people in private residences to their door to receive
circulars or other advertising matter was unconstitutional when
applied to members of Jehovah's Witnesses. While the Court rested
its decision primarily on the fact that the ordinance as applied pro-
hibited the free exercise of religion,4" it also relied on the fact that
the ordinance tended to curtail free speech because the distribution
of speech was restricted.44 However, the Court did note that this
ordinance was designed to protect a legitimate interest, that of pri-
vacy in the home, but in balancing the interests, the considerations
of free speech and the free exercise of religion out-weighed this
interest.
41
These ideas were carried over in the later case of Saia v. New
York.48 In this case the city of Lockport had an ordinance which
made it a crime to operate a loud-speaker which cast sound on a
public street except where matters of public concern were broadcast
and provided that advance permission must be obtained from the
chief of police. Saia obtained permission and proceeded to give
lectures on religious subjects in the town park by way of a loud-
speaker system on his car. Due to protests from some of the patrons
of the park, this permission was revoked. Saia continued to give
his lectures and to use his loud-speaker; as a result, he was con-
victed under the terms of this ordinance. On appeal the Court split,
the majority holding that this ordinance was unconstitutional on its
face because it was a prior restraint of speech.' Four Justices dis-
sented pointing out the difficulty of escaping from this type of noise s
and the obvious fact that the ordinance only prohibited one means
42319 U.S. 141 (1943). 3 Id. at 142.
"Id. at 147. "r Id. at 144.,8344 U.S. 558 (1948). 7 Id. at 559.
'8Id. at 563 (Dissenting Opinion of Justice Frankfurter jointed by Jus-
tices Reed and Burton).
1962]
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of distribution of speech.49 The dissent felt that the individual's
privacy out-weighed the right to speak in this manner.
The extreme position of the majority was repudiated by the Court
at its next term in Kovacs v. Cooper0 where it was held that a city
ordinance which prohibited the use of loudspeakers which emitted
"loud and raucous" noises on the public streets was constitutional.
The majority and concurring Justices all were of the opinion that
cities could impose some reasonable restraints on the means of
distribution of speech when these means tended to unduely disturb
the privacy of others. Saia was distinguished on the ground that it
involved licensing left to the uncontrolled discretion of the chief of
police without adequate standards.5" Where adequate standards are
written into the ordinance, it will be sustained. Thus the standard
of "loud and raucous" was held to be sufficiently definite and certain
to guide administrative action in regard to speech. Also, the Court
distinguished the loudspeaker situation from the hand-bill situation,
noting that the individual cannot be forced to take and read the
paper whereas, in the case of loud noise, he has no choice except to
listen; thus "he is practically helpless to escape this interference with
his privacy by loud-speakers" 2 Accordingly, privacy of the indi-
vidual was recognized by the Court as a legitimate interest which
deserves protection. Speech must be so limited that it does not
unduely disturb the privacy of others, and the first amendment
guarantees in regard to speech were not designed to give speakers
an unlimited license to disturb the privacy of others.
An individual's right to be free from loud speech is not absolute,
however, and other factors will be balanced in the resolution of the
particular controversy. This was illustrated in Public Utilities
Comm'n v. Polk.3 Here, a privately owned transit company in the
District of Columbia installed loud-speakers in its streetcars and
buses to provide "music as you ride" for its patrons. Out of every
half-hour of music provided, there was about a minute of commer-
cials extolling the virtues of the transit company. Acting in response
,9Id. at 568. (Dissenting Opinion of justice Jackson.)336 U.S. 77 (1949).
'Id. at 82. The Supreme Court of New Jersey had construed the stand-
ard in the ordinance to be strictly limited to sound trucks with "loud and
raucous" noises. Kovacs v. Cooper, 135 N.J.L. 64, 66, 50 A.2d 451, 452
(1946). This construction the United States Supreme Court followed. Id.
at 84.
I2 d. at 86.
'343 U.S. 451 (1952).
[Vol. 40
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to complaints from some of the patrons to this innovation, the Com-
mission found as facts (1) use of such devices was "consistent with
public comfort and safety"; (2) such devices presented no hazard
in regard to safety of the operation of vehicles; and (3) an over-
whelming majority of the patrons approved of the installation.54
Pollak appealed from this determination on the ground that the
Commission made errors of law in its determination. One error
assigned was that the decision was in violation of rights given to
citizens under the first amendment. The court of appeals reversed
the Commission "5 holding that the constitutional issue was properly
raised because the federal government was the agency which gave the
transit company an exclusive monopoly to operate in the District and,
as a result, there was governmental action involved. Also, this court
held that these devices violated the patron's liberty as secured by the
first and fifth amendments. 6
The Supreme Court sustained the Utilities Commission and
reversed the court of appeals. The majority rejected any claims
that the first amendment alone was violated by this practice. They
pointed out that no objectionable propaganda was put forth over
these speakers and the volume of the sound emitted by the speakers
was not loud enough to prevent conversation between passengers.57
To objections raised in connection with the commercials broadcast,
the Court said that these did not sustain a claim that passengers
were a captive audience forced to listen to commercial advertising
against their will." Finally, the Court rejected the contention that
the fifth amendment, when read with the first amendment, gave the
patrons a right of privacy in this situation. The Court pointed out
that in a public place, such as a streetcar or a bus, an individual's
rights of privacy are not as great as in his home; the interests of all
concerned must be taken into account in the drafting of regulations
for public vehicles, and the interests of the few cannot override the
interests of the many in this situation.5 9 In its decision, the Court
gave recognition to an individual's right to be free from loud and
annoying noises but, in balancing these against the interests of the
public in general, determined that on a public streetcar where the
"' Capital Transit Co., 81 P.U.R. (n.s.) 122, 126 (1949).
" Pollak v. Public Utilities Commission, 191 F.2d 450 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
" Id. at 453. 17 343 U.S. at 463.
18 Ibid. 59 Id. at 464.
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majority of the patrons had no objection to the loudspeakers their
interests should prevail.
That privacy in the home will be protected by the Court in some
situations against certain types of speech was demonstrated in
Breard v. Alexandria.6" This case involved a "Green River ordi-
nance"'" which was enacted by the city of Alexandria to prohibit
any "solicitors, peddlers, hawkers, itinerant merchants or transient
vendors of merchandise" from going onto property used for private
residences without the owner's consent.62 Breard was in charge of
a group selling subscriptions to magazines; this group was con-
ducting a sales campaign in Alexandria. Members of the group
went to a number of private residences without invitation from the
owners in order to make sales; as a result, they were convicted under
the provisions of the ordinance. Breard contended that the ordi
nance was unconstitutional as applied to him because it acted as a
restrain on the distribution of speech. This was rejected by the
Supreme Court which said that the test was "a balancing of the
conveniences between some householders' desire for privacy and the
publisher's right to distribute publications" since the rights to free
speech given in the first amendment are not absolute. Here, since
the restriction was merely on one means of distribution it was rea-
sonable and the interest of the individual in his privacy prevailed.
In two areas where first amendment rights are involved, there
has been a recognition and protection of a right of privacy to the
individuals. Thus, where individuals associate themselves in lawful
groups which aim to achieve lawful ends, they have a right to keep
the fact of their membership private and governmental agencies can-
not force them to disclose this fact. And, where the right of free
speech is being exercised, it must be exercised in such a manner that
it will not disturb the privacy of individuals in their home or in
public. In both situations, the Court will balance the interests of
the individual to his privacy against the interest of the public in
having the membership of the association or the speech disseminated
00341 U.S. 622 (1951).
61 So named because the prototype was enacted by the town of Green
River, Wyoming, in 1931. For an earlier case involving the prototype see
Town of Green River v. Fuller Brush Co., 65 F.2d 112 (10th Cir. 1933),
which held that the ordinance was not arbitrary or unreasonable and that it
did not constitute a burden on interstate commerce or deprive business of




to all. But, it seems clear that privacy of the individual is one factor
that the Court will take into consideration in the determination of
cases which arise in these areas.
CHARLES M. HENSEY
Contracts-Cost-Plus Building and Construction Contracts-
Interpretation of "Cost"
Perhaps the most frequently litigated issue arising from con-
struction contracts on a cost-plus basis' is the proper interpretation
of the word "cost." In Lytle, Campbell & Co. v. Somers, Fitler &
Todd Co.,' the leading case in this area, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court formulated the general rule3 that, unless a definition is ex-
pressly written into the contract, "cost" must be interpreted to mean
only those expenses which can be said to be "operative" or of a
productive nature in actually completing the construction, as dis-
tinguished from non-productive, indirect and general expenses or
"overhead." 4 The latter are presumed to have been provided for in
the agreed percentage of profit.5
'A "cost-plus contract" is one in which the contractor agrees to do cer-
tain work at cost plus a stated percentage of the cost as profit. It is different
from a "cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contract" where the agreement is to do work
at cost plus a fixed amount of compensation, but for the purposes of this
note no distinction will be made between them since the problems attendant
to the interpretation of the word "cost" are the same in each. See, e.g.,
Continental Copper & Steel Indus. v. Bloom, 139 Conn. 700, 96 A.2d 758
(1953). See generally 17 C.J.S. Contracts §367(b) (1939); Annot. 27
A.L.R. 48 (1923).
2276 Pa. 409, 120 At. 409 (1923).
'Since the Lytle, Campbell case purported to lay down a general rule
for the interpretation of all cost-plus contracts no attempt has been made to
reconcile the cases on the basis of the precise wording of the contract before
the court. Those courts citing and relying on the Lytle, Campbell case have
tended to look to the class of contract involved, rather than the particular
words employed. See, e.g., Vinson & Pringle v. Lanteen Medical Lab., 63
Ariz. 115, 159 P.2d 612 (1945) ; Jensen v. Manthe, 168 Neb. 361, 95 N.W.2d
699 (1959); Washington Const. Co. v. Spinella, 8 N.J. 212, 84 A.2d 617
(1951); Nolop v. Spettel, 267 Wis. 245, 64 N.W.2d 859 (1954). Cf. Dunn
v. Hammon Drug Co., 79 Ariz. 101, 284 P.2d 468 (1955).
'The rule of Lytle, Campbell has been cited with approval in many cases,
none of which have questioned its validity. See, e.g., Advance Auto Body
Works, Inc. v. Asbury Transp. Co., 10 Cal. App. 2d 619, 52 P.2d 958 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1935); Michelson v. House, 54 N.M. 197, 218 P.2d 861 (1950).
The normal definition of the word "profit," in the absence of circum-
stances tending to show otherwise, is "net profit," that is, the remainder
after all expenses of whatever nature have been paid. Buie v. Kennedy, 164
N.C. 290, 80 S.E. 445 (1913); Thomas v. Columbia Phonograph Co., 144
Wis. 470, 129 N.W. 522 (1911). Yet the word "profit" in a cost-plus agree-
ment is given a different meaning in that certain types of expenses, those
1962]
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The great weight of authority appears to be that under a cost-
plus agreement the contractor is not entitled to recover as part of
his "cost" that portion of his general overhead directly attributable
to the specific undertaking in question.' But the decisions display a
striking lack of unanimity as to whether certain specific items should
be classified as "costs" or "overhead." Among such items are taxes
and insurance, supervision fees, sub-contractor's overhead and profits,
wages paid to unproductive or non-essential labor, and use, rental
and depreciation of equipment.
Taxes and Insurance
There would appear to be little doubt that expenses for public
liability and workmen's compensation insurance and various social
security taxes7 do not contribute directly toward the erection of a
classified as "overhead," are presumed to be included within the stated
percentage of profit. No case has been found in which this anomaly has
been noted, but there appears to be no sound reason for creating an inflexible
exception to the general rule.
'See, e.g., Denemark v. Ed B. Mooney, Inc., 218 Ark. 944, 237 S.W.2d
41 (1951); House v. Fissell, 188 Md. 160, 51 A.2d 669 (1947); Shaw v.
G. B. Beaumont Co., 88 N.J. Eq. 333, 102 Atl. 151 (Ct. Ch. 1917). Contra,
Hoggson Bros. v. Spiekerman, 175 App. Div. 144, 161 N.Y. Supp. 930
(1916) ; cf. Hamilton v. Coogan, 7 Misc. 677, 28 N.Y. Supp. 21 (C.P. 1894).
In Benes v. Hickox Bldg. Co., 89 N.E.2d 315 (Ohio App. 1949), general
overhead was treated as part of cost in computing damages for breach of a
cost-plus contract where the owner had prevented performance.
The rule denying overhead would appear to be inconsistent with the
practice of computing damages for breach of a regular fixed-fee contract.
Where performance of a fixed-fee contract has been prevented, the measure
of damages is the cost of the work already done plus the profit reasonably
expected if completion had been allowed. There overhead is treated as part
of cost. See Sofarelli Bros., Inc. v. Elgin, 129 F.2d 785 (4th Cir. 1942);
Grand Trunk Western R.R. v. H. W. Nelson Co., 116 F.2d 823 (6th Cir.
1941); Snyder v. Reading Scho. Dist., 311 Pa. 326, 166 At]. 875 (1933);
Dravco Contracting Co. v. James Rees & Sons Co., 291 Pa. 387, 140 Atl. 148
(1927). But cf. Harris & Harris v. Crain & Denbo, 256 N.C. 110, 123 S.E.2d590 (1962).
It would also appear that a different rule may be applied where the con-
tract is to manufacture an article in the first instance on a cost-plus basis
as opposed to the construction of a building. In Mailander v. Continental
State Bank, 11 S.W.2d 615 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928), the court stated in a
dictum that the rule denying recovery of overhead under a cost-plus contract
did not apply in this situation, but did not say what the correct rule was. No
case has been found squarely on point where the contract in question was
on a cost-plus basis. Cf. Alvey Conveyer Mfg. Co. v. Kansas City Terminal
Ry., 356 Mo. 770, 203 S.W.2d 606 (1947); International Contract Co. v.
City of Tacoma, 79 Wash. 311, 140 Pac. 373 (1914).
As employers, contractors are generally required by state and federal
law to purchase certain insurance and pay employment taxes if they employ
more than a stated number of persons. See, e.g., INT. REv. CODE OF 1954,
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building but are part of the general cost of doing business and are,
therefore, indirect and non-productive. Arizona and Rhode Island
have held that these are not proper charges under a cost-plus con-
tract unless it affirmatively appears the parties intended otherwise.8
However, the trend appears to be toward treating these items as
part of cost.9
Supervision Fees
Under the Lytle, Campbell rule only the actual manual labor
performed on the structure may be recovered as cost. This would
appear to preclude wages paid to a foreman or supervisor as an item
of cost; yet the trend of the courts is toward allowing supervision
fees, at least where the supervisor is an employee and not the con-
tractor himself.'0 Washington has drawn an interesting distinction
§§ 3301 (unemployment insurance), 3111 (F.I.C.A.); MD. ANN. CODE art.
95A, § 8 (1957) (unemployment insurance); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 28-29-
6 (1956) (workmen's compensation insurance).8 Vinson & Pringle v. Lanteen Medical Lab., 63 Ariz 115, 159 P.2d 612
(1945); Brown v. Benn, 75 R.I. 76, 63 A.2d 781 (1949); Pelletier Const.
Co. v. Trullis, 70 R.I. 121, 37 A.2d 369 (1944).
'House v. Fissell, 188 Md. 160, 51 A.2d 669 (1947) ; Jensen v. Manthe,
168 Neb. 361, 95 N.W.2d 699 (1959) (dictum). Cf. Piehl v. Marino 254
Wis. 538, 36 N.W.2d. 694 (1949), where these items were not allowed due
to failure of the contractor to establish that they were reasonable.
The California decisions are in conflict. These items were not allowed
in Advance Auto Body Works, Inc. v. Asbury Transp. Co., 10 Cal. App. 2d
619, 52 P.2d 958 (Dist. Ct. App. 1935), but this decision appears not to
have been followed, and there is no ruling as yet by the California Supreme
Court. These items were allowed in Eby v. Bensemon, 177 Cal. App. 2d 756,
2 Cal. Rptr. 503 (Dist. Ct. App. 1960); Vowels v. Witt. 149 Cal. App. 2d
257, 308 P.2d 415 (Dist. Ct. App. 1957) (dictum); Cunningham v. Weaver,
130 Cal. App. 2d 787, 279 P.2d 830 (Dist. Ct. App. 1955) ; cf. Citizens State
Bank v. Gentry, 20 Cal. App. 2d 415, 67 P.2d 364 (Dist. Ct. App. 1937)
(allowed on an estoppel theory); Boat & Barge Corp. v. Beverly Fin. Co.,
71 Cal. App. 2d 800, 163 P.2d 913 (Dist. Ct. App. 1945).
Washington has held that sales tax is an item of cost. Irwin v. Sanders,
49 Wash. 2d 600, 304 P.2d 697 (1956). It has also been held that the
Indiana gross income tax is an item of cost to the contractor as a tax directly
chargeable to the work. Herlihy Mid-Continent Co. v. Northern Ind. Pub.
Ser. Co., 245 F.2d 440 (7th Cir. 1957).
" The decisions in this area are in conflict. In Timmons v. Nelsen, 159
Neb. 193, 66 N.W.2d 406 (1954), it was held that the salary of a general
supervisor could not be recovered as cost since this was the responsibility of
the contractor himself, even though another was hired to do the work. But
the expense of work actually performed by the supervisor in construction
was allowed. But see Jensen v. Manthe, 168 Neb. 361, 95 N.W.2d 699
(1959), where the court stated in a dictum that supervision costs were gen-
erally regarded as operative and not overhead.
Supervision costs were allowed in Churchill v. Anderson, 128 F. Supp.
425 (W.D. Ky. 1955) (supervisor was partner of contractor); Crone v.
Amado, 69 Ariz. 389, 214 P.2d 518 (1950); Ferguson v. A. F. Stewart
1962]
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between supervision at the "operative" and at the "administrative"
level, including the former as an item of cost but classifying the
latter as overhead."
Sub-Contractor's Overhead and Profits
Under a strict application of the Lytle, Campbell rule the main
contractor may not include as part of his costs any sums paid to
sub-contractors for items which he could not have included had he
done the work himself. Thus the sub-contractor's overhead and
profits must be paid by the main contractor out of his own profits.
Only one case so holding has been found. 2 The weight of authority
is that the entire amount paid to sub-contractors is part of the main
contractor's cost, even though this may include overhead and
profits.'
8
Wages Paid to Unproductive or Non-Essential Labor
Often an employer cannot obtain labor at any price without com-
plying with various union regulations concerning the minimum num-
ber of laborers to be hired, rest periods, and so forth. Such regulations
may substantially increase labor costs without resulting in a corre-
spondingly greater work out-put. Under the Lytle, Campbell rule
that portion of labor costs which might be said to be unproductive
or non-essential would be excluded from costs.' 4 Yet in Willett v.
Davis,'5 the one case in which the problem has been squarely raised,
the Washington Supreme Court had little difficulty in including as
cost all wages required to be paid in order to get the work done,
Const. Co., 115 Okla. 31, 241 Pac. 121 (1925). Cf. Carrico v. City & County
of San Francisco, 177 Cal. App. 2d 97, 2 Cal. Rptr. 87 (Dist. Ct. App. 1960)
(general contractor allowed to recover for compensation paid by sub-contrac-
tor to superintendent).
" Whitney v. McKay, 54 Wash. 2d 672, 344 P.2d 497 (1959)." Grafton Hotel Co. v. Walsh, 228 Fed. 5 (4th Cir. 1915).
1" Churchill v. Anderson, 128 F. Supp. 425 (W.D. Ky. 1955); Carrico v.
City & County of San Francisco, 177 Cal. App. 2d 97, 2 Cal. Rptr. 87 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1960); Eby v. Bensemon, 177 Cal. App. 2d 756, 2 Cal. Rptr. 503
(Dist. Ct. App. 1960); Ford & Butterleld v. St. Louis, K. & N.W. Ry., 54
Iowa 723, 7 N.W. 126 (1880); Baker v. Stamps, 82 So. 2d 858 (La. App.
1955) ; Jensen v. Manthe, 168 Neb. 361, 95 N.W.2d 699 (1959) ; Hamilton v.
Coogan, 7 Misc. 677, 28 N.Y. Supp. 21 (C.P. 1894). Kentucky and Wiscon-
sin have held that whether these items were intended to be included as cost is
a jury question. Thoroughbred Motor Court, Inc. v. Allen Co., 296 S.W.2d
690 (Ky. 1956); Piehl v. Marino, 254 Wis. 538, 36 N.W.2d 694 (1949)."Nolop v. Spettel, 267 Wis. 245, 64 N.W.2d 859 (1954).15 30 Wash. 2d 622, 193 P.2d 321 (1948).
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regardless of whether the wage-earners actually contributed directly
to the construction.
Use, Rental and Depreciation of Equipment
It has been held, in the absence of agreement to the contrary,
that one who agrees to perform work impliedly agrees to supply the
necessary tools at his own expense.' 6 Thus, a contractor under a
cost-plus agreement may not charge for the use of equipment owned
by him.' 7  On this point, at least, there is general agreement.' 8
However, Oklahoma has allowed a contractor to charge for repairs
to his equipment which was damaged in performance."
The contract before the court in Lytle, Campbell was on a "time
and materials" basis. Whether the operative expense test is of much
value in construing a cost-plus agreement with a different wording
would seem to be at least doubtful. If the case be taken as establish-
ing a general rule for the classification of expenses under cost-plus
contracts as a class, without regard to the particular wording of the
contract under consideration,2" it would appear to be unsound in that
it displaces the normal canons of interpretation and precludes ex-
trinsic evidence tending to show the intention of the parties.
The preferable view would seem to be that the terms "cost" and
"overhead" have no legal definition but must be interpreted in the
light of the surrounding circumstances. 2 1 This leaves the court free
to determine the intent of the parties from such factors as the customs
of the trade, the nature of the undertaking, and the tenor of the
agreement as a whole. A controlling element in one case was the
"0 Shaw v. G. B. Beaumont Co., 88 N.J. Eq. 333, 102 At. 151 (Ct. Ch.
1917); Lytle, Campbell & Co. v. Somers, Fitler & Todd Co., 276 Pa. 409,
120 At. 409 (1923), referred to with approval in Pioneer Constructors v.
Symes, 77 Ariz. 107, 267 P.2d 740 (1954); Michelson v. House, 54 N.M.
197, 218 P.2d 861 (1950)."TLytle, Campbell & Co. v. Somers, Fitler & Todd Co., supra note 16.
" Charles Elmer & Sons v. Kelly, 263 Fed. 687 (5th Cir. 1920); Savan-
nah A. & N. Ry. v. Oliver, 174 Fed. 140 (5th Cir. 1909); Pioneer Con-
structors v. Symes, 77 Ariz. 107, 267 P.2d 740 (1954) ; Jensen v. Manthe, 168
Neb. 361, 95 N.W.2d 699 (1959) (dictum); Michelson v. House, 54 N.M.
197, 218 P.2d 861 (1950).
19 Ferguson v. A. F. Stewart Const. Co., 115 Okl. 31, 241 Pac. 121 (1925).
20 See note 3 supra.
21 Cost: Navco Hardwood Co. v. Mobile & Gulf Nay. Co., 214 Ala. 176,
106 So. 862 (1925) (on rehearing); Singer Metals, Inc. v. Industrial Man-
agement Corp., 116 Cal. App. 2d 85, 253 P.2d 515 (Dist. Ct. App. 1953);
Boston Molasses Co. v. Molasses Dist. Corp., 274 Mass. 589, 175 N.E. 150
(1931). Overhead: Wynkoop Hallenbeck Crawford v. Western Union, 268
N.Y. 108, 196 N.E. 760 (1935).
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fact that the contract called for the abnormally high profit of two
hundred per cent."2
Nearly all of the litigation over the proper meaning of the word
"cost" in cost-plus contracts could have been prevented by careful
draftsmanship. Due to the unsettled state of the law in the area and
the relative lack of authority,2" the attorney faced with the task of
drafting such an agreement would be well advised to carefully define
the specific items intended to be covered by or excluded from "cost."
JOSEPH STEVENS FERRELL
Contracts-Indefinite Duration of Exclusive Sales Agreements-Dis-
tributor's Right to Prospective Profits for a Reasonable Time
In the recent case of General Tire & Rubber Co. v. Distributors
Inc.,1 the North Carolina Supreme Court, by way of dictum, ap-
proved the majority view that an exclusive sales and distributors
contract, which expresses no time for its duration, will by implication
of law be considered to run for a reasonable period of time.2
The parties orally agreed that the defendant would be the sole
and exclusive distributor of plaintiff-manufacturer's product in North
and South Carolina for an indefinite period of time. Shortly there-
after, due to insufficiency of defendant's working capital, the parties
executed a written agreement, known as a "Warehouse Agreement,"
whereby the plaintiff agreed to consign goods to defendant while
retaining legal title to them. A year later this agreement was altered
by an oral modification which provided that plaintiff would continue
his consignment of goods as before for a stated period of three years,
during which time the defendant would purchase the goods by
monthly installments. Under this purchasing agreement, the de-
fendant, who was in arrears in payments, refused to surrender the
goods upon request and plaintiff brought this action to recover their
"The court quite properly held that cost was intended to include only
actual out-of-pocket expenses. Loewy v. A. Rosenthal, Inc., 104 F. Supp.
496 (E.D. Mich. 1952).
- North Carolina has never explicitly ruled on the construction of a cost-
plus contract, but in Harris & Harris v. Crain & Denbo, 256 N.C. 110, 123
S.E.2d 590 (1962), the court clearly implied they were inclined to the ma-
jority view that overhead cannot be considered part of cost.
-253 N.C. 459, 117 S.E.2d 479 (1960).
'E. I. Du Pont Nemours & Co. v. Claiborne-Reno Co., 64 F.2d 224 (8th
Cir. 1933); J. C. Millett Co. v. Park Tilford Distillers Corp., 123 F. Supp.




possession. The defendant counterclaimed for $50,000 damages,
alleging that plaintiff, by demanding the goods, had breached the
distributorship contract.3 On the single issue of whether plaintiff
wrongfully took possession of the goods, the jury- found for the
plaintiff and the defendant appealed. The supreme court reversed
on other grounds,4 but further stated the modern majority rules that
a distributorship contract which expresses no time for its duration
is terminable only after it has run for a reasonable time. Previously
the majority rule had been that a principal generally had the right
to cancel at will a selling agency contract which was silent as to time,
particularly where the agency was not coupled with an interest and
the cancellation was in good faith.5 However, as the result of the
increasing number of distributor contracts and the fact that under
these contracts the agent is required to expend large sums of money
and to undertake other obligations in preparation for performance,
the courts have more recently held that the agent has a substantial
interest in the contract and therefore should not be placed at the
mercy of the manufacturer.6 Evidence of such expenses and acts of
Although the court concluded that the subsequent oral agreement of
July 1957 contemplated that the distributorship would continue as long as
thepurchasing agreement, the two contracts were in fact separate and distinct.
The trial court submitted the following single issue to the jury, "Did
the plaintiff wrongfully take its inventory from the defendant's warehouse ?"
The Supreme Court reversed on this point and said that this issue alone
would not decide the case. Before the plaintiff would be entitled to the
possession of the goods, the jury would have to find (1) that the plaintiff
was the rightful owner; (2) that the defendant had breached the "Warehouse
Agreement" as modified by the parol agreement; (3) that the defendant
refused to relinquish possession of the goods and thereby was wrongfully
retaining them.
'Victor Talking Mach. Co. v. Lucker, 128 Minn. 171, 150 N.W. 790
(1915); Meyer v. Pubitizer Pub. Co., 156 Mo. App. 170, 136 S.W. 5 (1911);
Codrad v. Golden, 275 App. Div. 946, 89 N.Y.S.2d 689 (1949); Winslow v.
Mayo, 123 App. Div. 758, 108 N.Y. Supp. 640, aff'd, 195 N.Y. 551, 88
N.E. 1135 (1908) ; Price v. Confair, 366 Pa. 538, 79 A.2d 224 (1951).
'Allied Equip. Co. v. Weber Engineering Prods., 237 F.2d 879 (4th Cir.
1956); Bach v. Freedin Calculating Mach. Co., 155 F.2d 361 (6th Cir. 1946).
See also WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1027A (rev. ed. 1936): "[Q]uite properly
[this contract of indefinite duration] has been held an enforceable executory
contract, binding upon each party for a reasonable time. It is the settled
law of agency that if the agent or employee furnishes a consideration in
addition to his mere services, he is deemed to have purchased the employ-
ment for at least a reasonable time where the duration of the employment is
not otherwise defined. A similar result should be reached though the dealer
is a buyer-distributor rather than a technical agent, where in addition to
undertaking to pay for the manufacturer's products as ordered, he promises
to establish or maintain adequate sales and demonstration facilities or to
provide a maintenance and repair service for handling said products."
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preparation create an inference that a definite or reasonable period
of employment was actually contemplated.' The majority view today
is that a contract which calls for continual performance or additional
expenditures by the agents or distributor and which makes no refer-
ence to its duration is to run for a reasonable time.'
Until the principal case, North Carolina has had only two occa-
sions to decide this questions and on both occasions has held, con-
trary to the modern majority rule, that these exclusive sales con-
tracts were terminable at will.9  However, with the dictum in the
principal case, it would appear that the old rules has been abrogated
and North Carolina has adopted the majority rule.
The court in the principal case also indicated that where a dis-
tributorship agreement of indefinite duration is breached by the manu-
facturer, the measure of damages recoverable by the distributor is the
prospective net profits that could be realized during the reasonable
period of time which the contract should run. In determining what
constitutes a reasonable time, the trial court should consider the
distributor's preliminary and promotional expenditures ;10 the length
of time the distributorship has been in operation before the notice of
termination ;11 what the prospects for future profits are; and whether
the distributorship has proven profitable during its actual operation.
The amount of initial outlay and expenditures is not recoverable as
such, but is evidence for the jury to consider in determining whether
the distributor has had a reasonable time for performance under the
contract. The purpose of allowing a reasonable time for the contract
is to provide the distributor with a reasonable opportunity to recoup
his expenditures. But under the circumstances, if recoupment is
impossible, then he is not entitled to recover expenses as a separate
item of damages in his action against the manufacturer for breach.
Under the general rule, if the distributor would have had these
expenses if the contract had been fully performed, then he is not
entitled to recover them.'
2
'Cummings v. Kelling Nut Co., 368 Pa. 448, 84 A.2d 323 (1951);
Slonaker v. P. G. Pub. Co., 338 Pa. 292, 13 A.2d 48 (1940).' Note 2 supra; Jacks Cookie Co. v. Brooks, 227 F.2d 935 (4th Cir. 1955).
'Fulghum v. Selma, 238 N.C. 100, 76 S.E.2d 368 (1953); Erskine v.
Chevrolet Motors Co., 185 N.C. 479, 117 S.E. 706 (1923).
" The defendant offered testimony that he had expended $22,915.91 in
promoting the plaintiff's line of floor covering in the Carolinas." Snead v. Sutherland, 118 Vt. 361, 111 A.2d 335 (1955).
"Smith v. Onyx Oil & Chemical Co., 218 F.2d 104 (3d Cir. 1955);
Units Oil Ref. Co. v. Ledford, 125 Colo. 429, 244 P.2d 881 (1952); Gibbs
v. H. T. Henning Co., 189 Ga. 675, 7 S.E.2d 238 (1940) ; Mississippi Power
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The present case is to be distinguished from the earlier case
of Erskine v. Chevrolet Motors Co. 3 in which the court allowed the
distributor to recover not only the difference in the contract and
resale price of the cars, but also his initial outlay or preparatory
expenditures.14 In the principal case, while profits were allowed, the
court said that since the contract was not terminable at will, the
distributor could not recover initial expenses. This outlay was part
of the consideration for the contract, and to allow the distributor to
recover original expenses in addition to prospective profits would
permit him to obtain a double recovery.
The court, in the Erskine case, although not adhering to the
majority rule, suggested that where the manufacturer breaches a
distributor contract the distributor might recover on the basis of
either fraud 5 or quasi-contract. 16
The policy of allowing the distributor a reasonable period of
time in order that he may have the chance to recoup his expenditures
is equitable, because the distributor has generally spent a considerable
amount of money and time preparing for performance of the con-
tract. When the manufacturer breaches the contract, the distributor
should, at least, be placed in the same position as before the agree-
ment was made. BORDEN R. HALLOWES
& Light Co. v. Pitts, 181 Miss. 344, 179 So. 363 (1938); Platts v. Arnet, 50
Wash. 2d 42, 309 P.2d 372 (1957).
18 185 N.C. 479, 117 S.E. 706 (1923). Here the plaintiff had contracted
with the defendant to be its agent to sell its cars. In reliance on the oral
promises of the defendant's manager, the plaintiff spent a considerable sum
in preparing for the performance of the contract. In addition he put in an
order for more cars than was the usual practice. After shipping only a few
cars to the plaintiff, the defendant repudiated the contract, and the plaintiff
sued for damages.
14 "It cannot well be assumed that the court intended that the outlay was
to be recovered in addition to profits. If the profits were to be taken as the
difference between the total sales during the period of the contract and the
purchase price of the automobiles to be sold with these expenses added, the
case would be different. If this probable net operating income was what
was meant by the court, the dictum is not contrary to the general rule."
Annot. 17 A.L.R.2d 1300, 1319 (1951).
15 If the distributor relies on the fraud theory, he must prove not only that
he relied on the representations of the manufacturer to his detriment, but
also that at the time the representations were made, the state of mind of the
manufacturer was such that he never intended to perform the contract.
Rudsill v. Whitner, 146 N.C. 403, 59 S.E. 995 (1907).
11 In the use of the quasi-contract theory, the distributor must show he
performed services or expended money upon the express or implied request
of the manufacturer. In such a case, the law will imply a promise on the
part of the manufacturer to pay for this benefit, and in this way prevent
unjust enrichment. Thompson v. Hunter's Ex'r, 269 S.W.2d 266 (Ky.
1954); Roper v. Clanton, 258 S.W.2d 283 (Mo. 1953).
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Domestic Relations-Divorce-Separation By Mutual Consent
Since 1907, when the North Carolina legislature first enabled a
husband and wife to be divorced after a specified period of separation,
the question of whether it is necessary for both parties to consent to
the separation has been an area of special confusion. The first sepa-
ration statute was passed in 1907 and provided for absolute divorce
after a 10-year separation.1 The first case to be decided under this
statute was Cooke v. Cooke.2 The court used broad language in
that case, stating that the plaintiff need not be the injured party and
that the separation need not be based on mutual consent of the parties.
The next two cases' retreated somewhat from the broad language of
the Cooke decision, and held that the party at fault could not seek a
divorce under the statute. This resulted from a codification of the
statutes which placed the statute in question under a heading which
provided that only the injured party could maintain an action. Im-
mediately after these cases, the legislature passed what is now G.S.
§ 50-6 in 1931.1 The new statute provided that a divorce would be
granted on application of either party. The first case decided directly
under G.S. § 50-6 held that the plaintiff could get a divorce though
he was not the injured party.5
In 1936 the court decided Parker v. Parker.' The plaintiff had
been guilty of willful abandonment, but had left his wife without any
deed of separation or mutual agreement. The court denied his
divorce because there was no mutual consent. The court construed
the clause in the statute providing that the separation must be "by
deed of separation or otherwise" to mean "by deed of separation or
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-5 (4) (1950).
2 164 N.C. 272, 80 S.E. 178 (1913).
'Lee v. Lee, 182 N.C. 61, 108 S.E. 352 (1921); Sanderson v. Sanderson,
178 N.C. 339, 100 S.E. 590 (1919). When the statutes were codified, the
old statute was placed under the heading, "The party injured may bring an
action for absolute divorce." Separation thus became the fourth listed reason
under the new codification.
'N.C. Sess. Laws 1931, ch. 72.
'Long v. Long, 206 N.C. 706, 175 S.E. 85 (1934). Two years later the
North Carolina court reverted again to the position that willful abandon-
ment would bar a plaintiff's action for divorce under the statute, on the
basis that the statute had only been re-enacted. Brown v. Brown, 213 N.C.
347, 196 S.E. 333 (1938). The scope of this note is confined to the problem
of mutual consent. For a discussion of the problem of the inability of a
party guilty of willful abandonment to sue for divorce under the North
Carolina separation statute, see Annot., 166 A.L.R. 498 (1947).0210 N.C. 264, 186 S.E. 346 (1936).
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otherwise by mutual consent." Hyder v. Hyder7 followed in the
same year and the court reaffirmed the Parker holding. The legis-
lature reacted swiftly and decisively. In 1937 the reference to "deed
of separation or otherwise" was deleted from the statute, leaving the
statute in its present form.8
When Byers v. Byers' was decided in 1942, the court seemed
to follow the lead of the legislature. Plaintiff proved that he was
not guilty of willful abandonment, though he had walked out on his
wife, and that he had provided for her since his departure. The
court granted his divorce and indicated that the statutory change
had in effect overruled Parker. The court stated that in Parker the
term "separation" was construed too narrowly, and that the legisla-
ture had sought to avoid this in the future by completely deleting
the phrase. The court also said that since the world "separation"
was not mentioned the legislature evidently did not intend that that
word, along with its doctrinal implications, be a prerequisite to an
action for divorce under the statute. In regard to mutual consent,
the court stated: "There must be at least an intention on the part of
one of the parties to cease cohabitation, and this must be shown to
have existed at the time alleged as the beginning of the separation
period; it must appear that the separation is with that definite pur-
pose on the part of at least one of the parties."' 0 After the Byers
case, there followed a line of four cases which either expressly or
impliedly upheld the position of the court in Byers that the intent of
one of the parties was sufficient under the statute."
Moody v. Moody'2 is the latest authority on the subject of mutual
consent. In this case, the defendant husband had suffered a head
injury. He and the plaintiff had separated and remained separate
"210 N.C. 486, 187 S.E. 798 (1936).8 N.C. Sess. Laws 1937, ch. 100: "Marriages may be dissolved and the
parties thereto be divorced from the bonds of matrimony on the application
of either party; if and when the husband and wife have lived separate and
apart for two years .... "
8 222 N.C. 298, 22 S.E.2d 902 (1942).
'Old. at 304.
"Mallard v. Mallard, 234 N.C. 654, 68 S.E.2d 247 (1951); Young v.
Young, 225 N.C. 340, 34 S.E.2d 154 (1945) ; Taylor v. Taylor, 225 N.C. 80,
33 S.E.2d 492 (1945) ; Lockhart v. Lockhart, 223 N.C. 559, 27 S.E. 2d 444
(1943). But see Williams v. Williams, 224 N.C. 91, 29 S.E.2d 39 (1944),
which seems out of line with the other decisions in that the court held there
that there was no mutual consent because the defendant was mentally in-
capable of assenting, and denied a divorce. However, the plaintiff alleged
and relied on mutual consent in this case.
12253 N.C. 752, 117 S.E.2d 724 (1961).
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and apart for over two years. Plaintiff brought her action under
G.S. § 50-6, and a demurrer was sustained in the trial court. The
supreme court affirmed, holding that there must be voluntary mutual
consent to separate under the statute or no action may be maintained.
The Moody case adds little but confusion to the law on the sub-
ject and represents a departure from Byers and the line of cases
following it. In the first place, an agreement made by the parties
before the husband suffered his injury was only cursorily mentioned
and thereafter disregarded. The only reason given for this was that
the plaintiff had only intended to separate from the date of the
injury.
The court discussed at length the "insanity" factor, and cited
Lawson v. Bennett'3 as authority. In that case, plaintiff brought
his action under G.S. § 50-6. Plaintiff's wife was insane and con-
fined in an institution. The court denied his divorce and held that
the remedy of G.S. § 50-5(6),"4 which provides for divorce after
five years of separation when one spouse is incurably insane and con-
fined in a mental institution, was exclusive in such cases. It is not
argued that this statute should not be exclusive where it applies.
But it is clear that in the Moody case the plaintiff could not possibly
maintain an action under G.S. § 50-5 (6) because the defendant was
not insane nor confined in a mental institution; he was merely in-
competent. These two things (incurable insanity and confinement)
are prerequisites for a G.S. § 50-5 (6) action and the court has so
held. 5 The result is that since the plaintiff could not sue under G.S.
§ 50-6 or under G.S. § 50-5 (6), she has no statutory remedy in this
state and is forced to remain married for life to a man from whom
she has long been separated."
The court in Moody relied mainly on the fact that the husband
was incompetent and therefore unable to form an intent to separate.
The intent of the wife standing alone was not enough. The court
apparently ignored the clear language of the Byers case and those
following it, and the rather obvious legislative intent expressed when
the General Assembly deleted "by deed of separation or otherwise"
from the statute.
" 240 N.C. 52, 81 S.E.2d 162 (1954).
"'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-5 (6) (Supp. 1961).
"5Mabry v. Mabry, 243 N.C. 126, 90 S.E.2d 221 (1955).
" The plaintiff could, however, establish an out-of-state domicile and bring
an action in another state.
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Many other states have statutory provisions for divorce after a
designated separation period. Some are more liberal than North
Carolina," and some require that the separation be voluntary.
8
Seven states have statutes which are like, or are very similar to, the
North Carolina statute. 9 None of these states seems to have had
the interpretation problems which have plagued the North Carolina
court in regard to separation by mutual consent. Arkansas, Lou-
isiana, Texas and Washington have explicitly held that mutual con-
sent is not necessary." Idaho and Kentucky have implicitly
agreed.2 Nevada, whose statute provides for divorce after a sepa-
ration in the trial court's discretion, also has held that mutual con-
sent is not necessary.2 There have been no cases construing Vir-
ginia's recently-passed statute.
In view of the glaring inconsistency presented by the Byers case
and those following it on the one hand, and the Moody case on the
other hand, it would seem that the time has come again to look to
the General Assembly and say, "Your move."
LAWRENCE T. HAMMOND, JR.
'7 Aiuz. REv. STAT. ANN. §25-312 (1956) provides that a divorce shall
be granted when husband and wife have been separated five years for any
reason..8 Dm. CODE ANN. § 13-1522 (Supp. 1960) ; D.C. CODE § 16-403 (1961);
MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 24 (1957); Wis STAT. ANN. § 247.07 (1957).
Apx STAT. ANN. §34-1202 (Supp. 1961); IDAHO CODE §32-610
(1948); Ky. REV. STAT. § 403.020 (1959); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:301
(1951) ; Trx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. § 4629 (1960) ; VA. CODE ANN. § 29-91
(1960) ; WASH. Rnv. CODE § 26.08.020 (1961). These states permit abso-
lute divorce after a specified period of separation. Mutual consent does not
appear in any of these statutes.
20 Brooks v. Brooks, 201 Ark. 14, 143 S.W.2d 1098 (1940); Otis v.
Bahan, 209 La. 1082, 26 So. 2d 146 (1946); Robertson v. Robertson, 217
S.W.2d 132 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949); Harp v. Harp, 43 Wash. 2d 821, 264
P.2d 276 (1953).
" In Finnegan v. Finnegan, 76 Idaho 500, 285 P.2d 488 (1955), the court
stated that only three things must be proved under the separation statute:
first, that the parties lived separate and apart; second, that there was no
cohabitation; third, that they were separated for the statutory period.
In Colston v. Colston, 297 Ky. 250, 179 S.W.2d 893 (1944), the court
held that the husband could count five years he was in jail into the separation
period and also said that the wife would have been able to count this period
had she brought the action. Thus it is inferable that the wife's intent alone
would have been enough. See also Hale v. Hale, 137 Ky. 831, 127 S.W. 475
(1910).
2 Pearson v. Pearson, 359 P.2d 386 (Nev. 1961).
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Evidence--Declarations of Intention
In Little v. Hower Brake Co.,1 a proceeding for workmen's
compensation, the plaintiff sought to recover for the death of her
husband. The deceased, a traveling salesman employed by the de-
fendant corporation, was killed in an automobile accident outside his
regular selling territory and after his regular working hours. As a
defense the defendant alleged that the deceased at the time of his
death was not acting in the course of his employment, and, therefore,
that the injury was not compensable as it neither arose out of nor
occurred in the course of his employment.2 From a denial of recovery
below, the plaintiff appealed assigning as error the exclusion of
certain statements made by the deceased prior to his death relating
to his purpose in making the trip in question.' These statements
were offered to show that the purpose of the trip was to see cus-
tomers in nearby towns and thereby establish that the deceased was
acting in the course of his employment at the time of the accident.
The North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the trial court, holding
that such statements were properly excluded because they did not
constitute part of the res gestae.
The court relied on Gassaway v. Gassaway & Owel;, Tnc. 4 where
certain statements made by the deceased two days and one day prior
to his departure, which tended to show that at the time of his death
he was engaged in his work as an employee, were held inadmissible
as not constituting a part of the res gestae.
Although the court decided the principal case solely on the res
gestae exception to the hearsay rule, it recognized that this theory
of admission may not be the only applicable one and possibly "not
as well reasoned as the theory that the declarations are admissible
as original evidence."' This "well reasoned theory" is the rule
'255 N.C. 451, 121 S.E.2d 889 (1961).
2 The defendant contended that the deceased had left his regular sales
area and was enroute to visit relatives in a nearby town at the time the
accident occurred.
'These, in summary, were: (a) a statement to a customer that the de-
ceased had to "see a customer" in Whiteville, made about nine hours before
leaving on the trip; (b) a statement of the same intent made to a service
station attendant only thirty minutes before his departure; and (c) a state-
ment of similar intent made to his wife over the telephone approximately
thirty minutes before he left.
' 220 N.C. 694, 18 S.E.2d 120 (1942).
5 255 N.C. at 455, 121 S.E.2d at 891.
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followed in a growing number of jurisdictions that a declaration by
the deceased of an intent to perform some act is admissible as origi-
nal evidence to show that the act was performed.6 This rule is
generally recognized as a completely separate exception to the hear-
say rule which is in no way connected with the res gestae exception.7
The landmark case on admission of declarations of intent is
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hillmon s In that case one Valters wrote
letters to his family declaring his intention to leave for Colorado and
other unknown parts with a certain Mr. Hillmon. An unidentified
body which the insurance beneficiaries of Hillmon claimed to be that
of their insured was later found. The insurance company denied
liability, claiming that the deceased man was not Hillmon, but
Walters. The United States Supreme Court held that the letters
were admissible as evidence that Walters had the intention of accom-
panying I-illmon on the trip. This case established the rule that
declarations of intention could be admitted to show that the act
intended was performed.9 Although some writers feel that its appli-
cation should be restricted,'0 Hillmon has been, for the most part,
'By the declaration "a mental state is proved not as an end in itself, but
as a basis for the further inference that the mental state found outlet in
conduct." McCoRmicK, EVIDENCE § 270, at 571 (1954). See also 6 WIG-
MoRE, EVIDENcE § 1725 (3d ed. 1940).
"State v. Journey, 115 Conn. 344, 161 AtI. 515 (1932) ; State v. Long,
32 Del. 380, 123 At. 350 (1923); People v. Fritch, 170 Mich. 258, 136 N.W.
493 (1912); State v. Farnam, 82 Ore. 211, 161 Pac. 417 (1916). Start, C.J.,
in a concurring opinion in State v. Hayward, 62 Minn. 474, 497, 65 N.W. 63,
70 (1895), stated: "[I]t is relevant to the issue to show that [the deceased]
did meet the defendant, and evidence of her declarations of an intention and
purpose to meet him was admissible as original evidence to prove that she
did in fact intend to meet him .... To sustain it on ground that the state-
ment of the deceased was part of the res gestae is . . . to assign a wrong
reason for a correct conclusion, which may lead to complications in future
cases." (Emphasis added.) This quotation was cited with approval and
made the basis of the opinion in Commonwealth v. Marshall, 287 Pa. 512,
135 At. 301 (1926).
145 U.S. 285 (1892).
o "The letters in question were competent, not as narratives of facts
communicated to the writer by others, nor yet as proof that he actually went
away from Wichita, but as evidence that, shortly before the time when other
evidence tended to show that he went away, he had the intention of going,
and of going with Hillmon, which made it more probable both that he did
go and that he went with Hillmon, than if there had been no proof of such
intention." 145 U.S. at 295-96. (Emphasis added.)
" See, e.g., Seligman, An Exception to the Hearsay Rude, 26 HARv. L.
Rnv. 146 (1912). Limitations have also been placed on this doctrine by
statute. See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 233, § 65 (1956), which provides
that death or unavailability of the witness furnishes a basis for admission of
declarations evidencing intention of the declarant.
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wholly endorsed by text writers," and is often referred to as the
weight of authority.'
2
Apparently the Hillmon rule has been applied by the North Caro-
lina court in certain situations, yet the court has cited Hilinon in
only one case.'" Perhaps the best example of its application is in
homicide cases where the court has held it reversible error to exclude
declarations of the deceased showing the presence or absence of sui-
cidal intent. 4 Conversely, it has been held error in such cases to
exclude threats by the accused" or by the deceased where they are
corroborative.' 6 Declarations of intention to perform a certain act
have also been allowed to show that the act was or was not per-
formed in the following cases: the making of a contract,17 the signing
of a deed,' s the marriage of the parties,'" and the making of a gift.
20
In admitting this evidence, the court seems to be directly in accord
with the holding in Hillmon.
In accepting the Hillmon rule, the courts of other jurisdictions
have applied it in different situations. Declarations of intention have
been allowed as evidence in the following cases: in homicide cases,
" McCORMICK, EVIDENcE §270 (1954); 6 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1725
(3d ed. 1940); Maguire, The Hillmon Case-Thirty Three Years After, 38
HARv. L. REv. 709 (1925); McBaine, Admissibility in California of Declara-
tions of Physical or Mental Condition, 19 CALIF. L. REv. 231 (1931); Mor-
gan, A Suggested Classification of Utterances Admissible as Res Gestae, 31
YALE L. J. 229 (1922).
" In applying the Hillinon rule the court in People v. Alcalde, 24 Cal. 2d
177, 148 P.2d 627 (1944), stated that it was following what "is deemed to
be the weight of authority." Although there are specific areas in many
jurisdictions where declarations of intention are admitted, there seems to be
only eleven states which have consistently followed the Hillmon rule in all
areas. These states are Connecticut, Delaware, Louisiana, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Minnesota, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas and Utah.
See Annot., 113 A.L.R. 268, 288 (1938).
"In State v. Davis, 177 N.C. 573, 98 S.E. 785 (1919), the court cited
language directly from Hillmon, apparently with some degree of approval, but
decided the case by use of the old standby, the res gestae.
' State v. Lagerholm, 208 N.C. 195, 179 S.E. 664 (1935) ; State v. Prytle,
191 N.C. 698, 132 S.E. 785 (1926). It is of interest to note that in State v.
Prytle the court relied on Commonwealth v. Trefethen, 157 Mass. 180, 31
N.E. 961 (1892), wherein Hillmon was cited.
" State v. Shook, 224 N.C. 728, 32 S.E.2d 329 (1944); State v. Allen,
222 N.C. 145, 22 S.E.2d 233 (1942). See generally STA SBuRy, NoRH
CAROLINA EVIDENCE § 162 (1946).
1 State v. Dickey, 206 N.C. 417, 174 S.E. 316 (1934); State v. Exum,
138 N.C. 599, 50 S.E. 283 (1905).'T Poindexter v. McCannon, 16 N.C. 373 (1830).
1 Summerlin v. Cowles, 101 N.C. 473, 7 S.E. 881 (1888).
10 Forbes v. Burgess, 158 N.C. 131, 73 S.E. 792 (1912).
'0 Bynum v. Fidelity Bank, 219 N.C. 109, 12 S.E.2d 898 (1941).
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to show an intent to go to a certain place,2 or to commit suicide,22
or to show that the killing was necessitated by self-defense ;23 in mur-
der by abortion cases, to show an intention to submit to the opera-
tion;24 in wills cases, to show an intent to exclude a certain person
as a beneficiary, or to destroy or alter a will;2 and in insurance
cases declarations of the insured have been admitted to identify the
proper beneficiary where the beneficiary named in the policy was
ambiguous.2 Declarations of intention have also been admitted to
show that the declarant actually made the intended trip ;"8 that he
delivered the deed or made the gift of which he spoke;29 that he
changed his domicile with intent to remain outside the jurisdiction ;3o
and that he went to the intended place. 1
There are also a great number of workmen's compensation cases
in which declarations of intention have been allowed to show that
the employee was acting in the scope of his employment at the time
of the accident. 2
21 State v. Journey, 115 Conn. 344, 161 At. 515 (1932) ; Shirley v. State,
168 Ga. 344, 148 S.E. 91 (1929); State v. Vial, 153 La. 883, 96 So. 796
(1923).
" Commonwealth v. Trefethen, 157 Mass. 180, 31 N.E. 961 (1892) ; State
v. Ilgenfritz, 263 Mo. 615, 173 S.W. 1041 (1915).
23 State v. Long, 2 Del. 380, 123 At. 350 (1923); State v. Farnam, 82
Ore. 211, 161 Pac. 417 (1916).
" People v. Northcott, 46 Cal. App. 706, 189 Pac. 704 (Dist. Ct. App.
1920); People v. Fritch, 170 Mich. 258, 136 N.W. 493 (1912); State v.
Paschall, 182 Wash. 304, 47 P.2d 15 (1935).
25 Atherton v. Gaslin, 194 Ky. 460, 239 S.W. 771 (1922); Buchanan v.
Davis, 12 S.W.2d 978 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1929).
" It re Estate of Oates, [1946] 2 All E.R. 735; In re Layer's Estate,
[1957] 21 West. Weekly R. (n.s.) 209, 10 D.L.R.2d 279 (Sask.).
"'John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Menson,*97 F. Supp. 320 (W.D.
Ark. 1951); Crawford v. Center, 193 Ark. 287, 100 S.W.2d 83 (1936).
.8 Wibye v. United States, 87 F. Supp. 830 (N.D. Cal. 1949); Lake Shore
Ry. v. Herrick, 49 Ohio St. 25, 29 N.E. 1052 (1892).
20 Feore v. Trammel, 213 Ala. 293, 104 So. 808 (1925) ; Walters v. Law-
ler, 297 Ill. 63, 130 N.E. 335 (1921); Kessler v. Von Bank, 144 Minn. 220,
174 N.W. 839 (1919).
" King v. McCarthy, 54 Minn. 190, 55 N.W. 960 (1893); Wilbur v.
Calais, 90 Vt. 335, 98 Atl. 913 (1916).
"Southern Ry. v. Tudor, 46 Ga. App. 563, 168 S.E. 98 (1933) ; Parker
v. State, 91 Tex. Crim. 68, 238 S.W. 943 (1921).
" See, e.g., Alexander Film Co. v. Industrial Commn, 136 Colo. 486, 319
P.2d 1074 (1957); Lewis v. Lowe & Campbell Athletic Goods Co., 247
S.W.2d 800 (Mo. 1952); Ervin v. Myrtle Grove Plantation, 206 S.C. 41, 32
S.E.2d 877 (1945); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Nelson, 174 S.W.2d 103 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1943); Prater v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 83 S.W.2d 1038 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1935).
In Smith v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 119 Conn. 483, 177 At. 524
(1935), the court admitted declarations of the deceased employee to show
that he was actually working along a certain road where the accident oc-
curred. In admitting this testimony the court quoted State v. Journey, 115
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American Sec. Co. v. Minard,3 which is directly on point with
the Little case, allowed as evidence statements made by the deceased
prior to his accident tending to show that he was acting in the scope
of his employment at the time of the accident. This case, and others
so holding, have allowed these declarations, not under any pretenses
of the res gestae, but under the Hillmon rule. Some courts, although
not allowing these declarations as original evidence under Hillmon,
will still allow them to corroborate other evidence which tends to
prove or disprove the fact in issue. 4
The argument in favor of admission of declarations of intention
as another exception to the hearsay rule is quite strong. Proponents
of the Hillmon doctrine point out that if it is properly limited,"5
there is no more danger of allowing improper evidence than with
any other exception to the hearsay rule. In many cases, where the
declaration of the declarant is the only direct evidence bearing on
the issue, its necessity is apparent.
The uncertainty in North Carolina has arisen not from any
complete denunciation by the court of the Hillmon rule, but from the
application of it in some cases, such as the homicide cases, and not
in others, such as the principal case. 6 No doubt this results from
the fact that the court feels this area is adequately covered by the
Conn. 344, 351, 161 Ati. 515, 517 (1932), to the effect that "'a declaration
indicating a present intention to do a particular act in the immediate future,
made in apparent good faith and not for self-serving purposes, is admissible
to prove that the act was in fact performed. It is admissible, not as part of
the res gestae but as a fact relevant to the fact in issue."' 119 Conn. at 490,
177 Atl. at 528.
" 118 Ind. App. 310, 77 N.E.2d 762 (1948). See also Indiana Steel
Prods. Co. v. Leonard, 126 Ind. App. 669, 131 N.E.2d 162 (1956). Both
of these cases cited Hilfnon as the basis for the admission of the declaration
of the deceased employee.
"'Associated Gen. Contractors v. Cardillo, 106 F.2d 324 (D.C. Cir. 1939)
(based on statutory interpretation); Altschuller v. Bressler, 289 N.Y. 463,
46 N.E.2d 886 (1943). It is pointed out in LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPEN-
SATION LAW § 29.73 (1952), that the trend seems to be to allow these decla-
rations in corroboration either by statutory amendment or judicial decision.
" People v. Alcalde, 24 Cal. 2d 177, 148 P.2d 627 (1944), the court set
up the following requirements for the admissibility of such declarations under
the Hili non rule: (a) that the declaration must tend to prove the declarant's
intention at the time it was made; (b) that it must have been made under
circumstances which naturally give verity to the utterance; and (c) that it
must be relevant to the issue in the case. See generally 6 WIGMORE, Evi-
DENCCE § 1725 (3d ed. 1940).
6 It should be noted that the Hillvion rule was never directly presented
to the court in the principal case, as this case was not cited by the appellant.




res gestae doctrine. However, the res gestae doctrine is not adequate
in cases like the principal case where the application of the Hillmon
rule might have given some potentially valuable information to the
jury.
It is submitted that the North Carolina court should accept the
Hillmon doctrine completely by extending it beyond its present
limited scope in this state to cover such cases as the principal case.
CARL A. BARRINGTON, JR.
Mortgages-Absolute Deeds Construed As Security Transactions
In Isley v. Browmt' the plaintiffs sought to have an absolute deed
of conveyance construed as a security for a debt. The plaintiffs
contended that they had signed the deed with the understanding
that the defendant, the grantee under the deed, would pay off an
indebtedness and allow them to repay him in monthly installments.
On appeal to the supreme court a judgment for the plaintiffs was
reversed (1) because of plaintiffs' failure to allege and prove that
the clause of redemption was omitted by mistake and (2) because of
plaintiffs' negligence in failing to read the instrument of conveyance
before signing it.
Generally, a deed of conveyance, although absolute on its face,
will be construed as a mortgage if it is given as security for a debt
and if the property was intended by the parties to stand as security.2
In the majority of jurisdictions this rule follows upon proof that the
parties intended a security transaction.3 However, North Carolina
has long required, in addition to proof of an intent to create a se-
curity, that it be shown that the clause of redemption was omitted
by reason of ignorance, mistake, fraud or undue advantage. More-
over, the former had to be shown by facts and circumstances dehors
the deed.'
In the principal case the Court, in giving its first reason for
reversal, stated that in order for the grantor of the absolute deed to
1253 N.C. 791, 117 S.E.2d 821 (1961).
'See, e.g., Hill v. Day, 231 Ark. 550, 331 S.W.2d 38 (1960). See gen-
erally Annot., 79 A.L.R. 937 (1932); Note 26 N.C.L. REv. 405. (1948).
See, e.g., Newell v. Pate, 264 Ala. 644, 89 So. 2d 170 (1956).
'See, e.g., Perkins v. Perkins, 249 N.C. 152, 105 S.E.2d 663 (1958) ; for
cases prior to 1939, see Notes, 26 N.C.L. REv. 405 (1948); 16 N.C.L. REv.
416 (1938). See also Jones v. Brinson, 231 N.C. 63, 55 S.E.2d 808 (1949)
(parel trust); Williams v. Joines, 228 N.C. 141, 44 S.E.2d 738 (1947)
(action for specific performance).
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have it converted into a security for a debt "it must be alleged and
proven that the clause of redemption was omitted by reason of
ignorance, mistake, fraud, or undue advantage. This must be estab-
lished by proof of declarations and proof of facts and circumstances,
dehors the deed, inconsistent with the idea of an absolute purchase."
5
This statement of the required proof departs materially from the
former requirement in three respects. First, it apparently eliminates
the necessity of proving intent.6 Secondly, it requires the omission
of the redemption clause to be established by proof of declarations
and proof of facts and circumstances dehors the deed. Heretofore,
this was the requirement for proving intent.7 Thirdly, it requires
proof of a declaration and of facts and circumstances outside the
deed. The Court had previously only required proof of facts and
circumstances outside the deed." Nevertheless, as the Court cites
and appears to rely upon prior decisions stating the double require-
ment of proving intent to create a security and that the clause of
redemption was omitted by reason of ignorance, mistake, fraud or
undue advantage, apparently it merely mistated the rule in the prin-
cipal case.9
The trial court submitted the following issue to the jury: "Did
the defendant obtain the deed to the property . . . by reason of the
ignorance or mistake of the plaintiffs, the fraud of the defendant, or
undue advantage of the plaintiffs, taken by the defendant?"' 10 The
jury answered the question in the affirmative. Although this jury
finding would seem to support the issue of mistake, the form of the
issue submitted renders it impossible to determine whether they
found all, several, or just one of the elements encompassed within
the alternatively framed issue. From the contradictory testimony
they could have found mistake on the part of the plaintiff, mistake
on the part of the defendant in giving the plaintiffs the wrong instru-
5253 N.C. at 792, 117 S.E.2d at 823.
' It would seem to follow that upon proper proof of omitting the redemp-
tion clause the intent to make a security transaction could be implied, but the
old rule expressly required proof of two things. See Perkins v. Perkins,
249 N.C. 152, 105 S.E.2d 663 (1958).
'Davenport v. Phelps, 215 N.C. 326, 1 S.E.2d 824 (1939); Note, 16
N.C.L. REv. 416 (1938).
' In previous cases using the phraseology declarations, facts, and circum-
stances, the Court held that intent could not be proved by simple declarations
of the parties, but bad to be established by facts and circumstances. Perkins
v. Perkins, 249 N.C. 152, 105 S.E.2d 663 (1958).
' Perkins v. Perkins, supra note 8.
10 253 N.C. at 792, 117 S.E.2d at 822.
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ment to sign, mistake on the part of both parties, or even fraud in the
factum" on the part of the defendant. On the basis of the court's
treatment of the issues raised, a trial court would be well advised to
submit and have the jury pass specifically and individually on the
elements of mistake, fraud or undue advantage. The separation of
the different elements of the submitted issue and individual deter-
mination on each by the jury would have greatly aided the plaintiffs
and also the court by pointing to what was specifically proved to
the jury.
The second reason the court gives for reversing appears to invoke
a form of estoppel against the plaintiffs for their failure to read the
instrument they signed. The Court stated, "The duty to read an
instrument or to have it read before signing it, is a positive one, and
the failure to do so, in the absence of any mistake, fraud, or oppres-
sion, is a circumstance against which no relief may be had, either
at law or in equity."12  The soundness of this rule could not be
seriously questioned, but it would seem to have no application to the
principal case for two reasons. First, it is to be noted that the
plaintiffs specifically relied upon fraud and mistake as grounds for
relief and the jury found fraud and mistake in the alternative issues
it affirmatively answered in favor of the plaintiffs."3 Secondly, the
plaintiffs admitted the ability to read but specifically alleged and
sought to show that they were not of sufficient intelligence to under-
stand the difference between an absolute deed and a mortgage. No
mention of this allegation was made except that the plaintiffs had
the duty to read, apparently even if it would be futile from the point
of understanding.'
The facts of the principal case would seem to demand the inter-
vention of equity regardless of the taut rules of law involved. Here
a man of little education, of less than moderate means, is faced with
a variety of expenses and pending foreclosure of his home. After
ten years of buying and building, he is supposed to have sold all his
rights therein for $100 to the defendant, a successful businessman,
" The Court dealt exclusively with the point of mistake and ignored the
issue of fraud which the plaintiffs relied upon as heavily at trial and on
appeal as they did mistake.
12253 N.C. at 793, 117 S.E.2d 823.
i81d. at 792, 117 S.E.2d at 822.
"In Streator v. Jones, 10 N.C. 423 (1824), the grantor was unable to
read or write; the court found gross inadequacy of price, oppression and
financial distress and granted relief.
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when the value of the land is almost $1700 and the amount owing
is less than $600. It would be difficult to imagine the parties meet-
ing on more unequal terms. Although at law a "'pepercorn' of
consideration is sufficient to support a promise," equity may inquire
further."
The harshness of the North Carolina rule is further illustrated
by what must be termed an exception to or an inconsistency with the
old double requirement. Under the old rule the grantor in order to
have the deed reformed had to allege and prove that the clause of
redemption was omitted by mistake, fraud, undue advantage or
undue influence. On the other hand, a creator of such grantor can
have the same absolute deed declared void upon the mere showing
of an intent to create a security. The deed, as to such creditor, is
upset on the ground that it is improperly recorded and would there-
fore tend to defraud, delay and hinder him.' If the security of titles
is of such paramount importance it should demand the application
of the double requirement here.'7  Yet the distinction in the two
situations would tend to indicate that implied fraud on the grantor's
creditors is more serious than any proven fraud upon the grantor.
It is submitted that this inconsistency in standards is unjustifiable.
The majority of jurisdictions require either by legislative is or
1 Dalzell, Duress by Economic Pressure, II, 20 N.C.L. REv. 341, 357
(1942). "With respect to value, mere inadequacy of price is of no more
weight in equity than at law. If a man who meets his purchaser on equal
terms, negligently sells his estate at an undervalue, he has no title to relief
in equity. But a court of equity will inquire whether the parties really did
meet on equal terms; and if it be found that the vender was in distressed
circumstances, and that advantages was taken of that distress, it will avoid
the contract." Wood v. Abrey, 3 Madd. 417, 56 Eng. Rep. 558 (1818).
1" Under the registration statutes the deed cannot be registered as an
absolute deed for it was not so intended; nor can it be registered as a mort-
gage for it does not purport on it face to be one. Foster v. Moore, 204 N.C.
9, 167 S.E. 383 (1932). This difference in standards has led to the sugges-
tion of an indirect method of securing the desired relief. See Note, 26 N.C.L.
REv. 405, 406 (1948).
17 Certainly "titles to property, which ought to be evidenced by solemn
instruments in writing," should not depend on the slippery memory of wit-
nesses. Clement v. Clement, 54 N.C. 184, 186 (1854). However, there seems
to be more justice in allowing a man the opportunity to recover his home
and property than securing property titles, especially when he contends he
never intended to convey, the circumstances seem to negate the idea of an
absolute sale, and there is no third party involved.
"s See e.g., ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 47, § 136 (1958) ; IDAHo CODE §§ 45-904,
-905 (Supp. 1961) ; MicHr. STAT. ANN. § 26.549 (1953). Two jurisdictions
require the grantor to retain possession. GA. CODE § 67-104 (1957) ; Miss.
CODE § 272 (1942). Several jurisdictions seek to protect third parties in this
situation. E.g., N.Y. REAL PROPERTY LAW § 320. Contra, MD. CODE ANN.
art. 66 § 1 (1957) ; PA. STAT. ANN. § 21-951 (1955).
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judicial19 action, that the plaintiff show by clear, cogent and con-
vincing evidence that there was the intent to create a security trans-
action. These statutes allow the reformation of conveyances to
conform to the intent of the parties while, at the same time protect-
ing the interest of any third parties.
It is submitted that the North Carolina legislature should adopt
a statute similar to the California statute which provides that a
conveyance will be deemed a mortgage if intended as security regard-
less of the omission of a clause of redemption or defeasance. 20
T. LA FONTINE ODOM
1 0Zivotosky v. Max. 75 N.Y.S.2d 553 (1947) (Sup. Ct. 1947), af'd, 92
N.Y.S.2d 631 (Sup. Ct. 1949). No statute or decision has been found simi-
lar to North Carolina's double requirement.
0 CAL. CIV. CODE § 2929. A man's ignorance or financial oppression
should not be allowed to fatten the purse of those who seek a "bargain" by
such circumstances. The defendant stated on cross examination that "if he
wanted to sell me a piece of property, I see no reason-if you can buy at a
bargain, I'll buy a bargain anywhere." Record, p. 83, Isley v. Brown, 253
N.C. 791, 117 S.E.2d 821 (1960).
